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A "Non-Partisan" Legislative Election in Minnesota
FRANK

J.

KENDRICK

*

Moorhead State College
In November, 1965, I appeared at a Moorhead, Minnesota, Education Association meeting as a member of
a panel to discuss the topic "Teachers in Political Action ." On the panel with me were four people, including
State Senator William B. Dosland of Moorhead, a representative of the League of Women Voters, a Moorhead
School Board member, and a junior high school teacher.
I was quoted by the local press as saying, "Teachers are
a select group of citizens. They are especi ally articulate
and well educated and, as such, should be a prime source
of candidates." (The Forum , Fargo-Moorhead, Nov. 5,
1965).
One of my reasons for being so emphatic about the
need for teachers to enter the political arena was that I
had been approached just three days before by Lt. Governor A. M . Keith about the possibility of my running
for the State Senate. For several months the Lt. Governor
had been touring the State, and as an adjunct to his own
campaign to secure the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party's endorsement for Governor, had been talking with
possible Liberal candidates for the Minnesota Legislature. I was one of these potential candidates, and having
been much inspired with the possibility of playing a part
in a new Liberal movement in the State, began to share
some of my enthusiasm with potential voters. Although
the panel agreed about the need for teachers to play
more active roles in politics, the members were not, I
later discovered, to show nearly as much interest in my
own candidacy for the State Senate.
It is my purpose in this paper to present a case study
of a campaign for the Minnesota State Senate. The campaign was my own, and although I was unsuccessful in
my first bid for public office, I did gain certain insights
into state and local politics which I would like to share
with others. Moreover, since my own campaign became
closely involved with the gubernatorial contest within the
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, I would also like to
make some observations concerning that particular issue.
Background

The 5 6th Senatorial District in which I ran consists of
two counties, Clay and Wilkin. The 1966 Minnesota redistricting plan did not affect the boundaries of this district because the population of the two counties together
is currently only slightly over 50,000, or almost exactly
what the ideal Senatorial district should be. But the
House district lines were changed in such a way as to include the City of Moorhead, the Village of Dilworth, and
the surrounding two townships in one district, and the
remainder of Clay County, and all of Wilkin County in
the other district. This meant that one of the two House
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members from the 56th District would have to draw
most of his votes from the City of Moorhead, and the
other would draw his support from rural Clay and Wilkin Counties.
Prior to 1966, all of Clay County, including the City
of Moorhead, had been represented for four years by
Conservative Douglas H . Sillers, a farmer who lived
within a few miles of the city. The 1966 re-districting
had placed the township within which his farm was located, in the new Moorhead district.
Wilkin County had been represented for ten years by
Liberal R. N. Nelson, an attorney from the City of
Breckenridge. Nelson died in the Spring of 1966, and was
succeeded by a Conservative, Arlan Stangeland, a farmer
from Wilkin County. Stangel and had defeated another
Wilkin County farmer, Clifford Ouse, in a special May
election in which the margin of victory was only sixtyfour votes.
In the Senate, Clay and Wilkin Counties were represented by Conservative William B. Dosland, an attorney
from Moorhead. Dosland had been elected in 1958, after
defeating an incumbent Conservative and two Liberals in
the Primary Election . He had been re-elected in 1962,
without opposition, and had since gained the reputation
of being one of the leading Conservative members of the
State Senate. Thus, after redistricting and the special
election in Wilkin County, the situation in the 56th
District was this: All three incumbent state legislators
were Conservatives. Of the three, the Senator was considered the most difficult to defeat, because he was widely respected in the District, was young, and had been unopposed for eight years. 1'he Representatives were both
farmers, and would have to run in re-aligned districts.
Nominally, Minnesota legislative elections are nonpartisan. That is, the law prevents the designation of
party affiliation on the ballots. In fact, the two parties
play very active roles in certain legislative contests in
Minnesota, particularly in and around the Cities of St.
Paul and Minneapolis. In the 56th District, however,
neither the Republicans nor the Democrats have been
very active in any but state-wide and Congressional contests. Wilkin County, in particular, has been the scene of
very little party activity, except in the two or three
months preceding Congressional elections. But in 1965,
with the election of a new County Chairman, Clifford
Ouse, the Wilkin County D.F.L. Party began to develop
into something more closely resembling a party organization.
In Clay County, both parties have maintained viable
organizations for at least a decade. But in 1966, the Republicans started to build an unusually effective organization for a party outside the Twin Cities Metropolitan
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area. Under a new County Chairman, the Party raised
$22,000 in 1966 to help state and local candidates, and
built an organization on precinct and ward lines which
could well be the envy of political parties in any part of
the country.
The Clay County D.F.L. Party, on the other hand, has
been plagued with factionalism for many years. It is not
a factionalism which is based upon ideological differences, or upon an urban-rural division, or even upon differences in economic or social backgrounds. Instead it
appears to be based upon little more than personality
clashes among the members. To a great extent, the division can be traced to the Congressional contest of 1958,
when the incumbent D.F.L. Congresswomen, Mrs. Coya
Knutson, was opposed in the Primary Election by another D.F.L. candidate, Marvin Evenson of Moorhead.
Evenson lost the Primary, but Mrs. Knutson was defeated in the General Election by Odin Langen, the present Representative from the Seventh District. The Primary contest caused bitter feelings at both the County
and District levels, each side blaming the other for the
loss of the General Election, and the conversion of a
former D.F.L. District into a Republican one.
At the Clay County D.F.L. Convention of 1965, one
faction had succeeded in capturing the Chairmanship,
and the following year the same group managed to fill
the rest of the Party offices. This takeover not only
aroused the animosity of the Party officers who had been
ousted, but also made it more difficult during the election
campaign later on to build a dependable, representative
Party organization. The difficulties were compounded by
the Party's electing a new Chairman who was politically
inexperienced and completely identified with the predominant faction. Compared with the Clay County Republican organization, the D.F.L. Party had neither the
organization nor the breadth of support necessary to
compete effectively.
A word is also in order at this point about the population trends of the 56th District, because these trends are
reflected in the local political situation. The one fact that
stands out above all others is that the City of Moorhead
is currently the fastest growing urban area in the State
of Minnesota. Between 1940 and 1950, Moorhead's population increased by 57 percent; from 1950 to 1960, it
increased another 54 percent; and between 1960 and
1965, it increased by another 17 .5 percent to reach a
total of 27,000 people. Thus, the average annual rate of
population increase since 1940 has been over 5 percent.
Moorhead is now part of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area which also includes Fargo and Cass County,
North Dakota, and Clay County, Minnesota.
Moorhead's rate of growth is attributable to several
factors, the most important of which is the business and
industrial activity of Fargo. It is estimated that approximately one-third of Moorhead's working residents are
employed in Fargo, which is presently a wholesale and
service center for the entire State of North Dakota. Thus,
Moorhead can accurately be called a "bedroom" community, or a suburb of Fargo, and politically it demonstrates many of the characteristics of a typical suburban
Journal of, Volume Thirty-four, No. 2, 1967

community. That is, it is becoming a Republican stronghold, which has supported aB Republican Presidential
candidates since 1952, with the exception of Senator
Goldwater. The rapid population growth has brought in
many upper-middle class residents who tend to vote Republican.
Outside of Moorhead, the only other city in the 56th
District is Breckenridge, in Wilkin County, which like
Moorhead is a border city adjacent to a larger North Dakota community. Breckenridge has approximately 4,500
people, or slightly less than half the population of Wilkin
County. Although Breckenridge has also been growing,
it has not matched Moorhead, and its voting patterns
over the past decade indicate that the majority of its residents still tend to vote Democratic, at least in Presidential elections.
The rural areas outside of Moorhead and Breckenridge differ by county. Rural Clay County has tended to
be D.F.L., or Democratic, in orientation, while rural
Wilkin County has been Republican. Thus, in the Presidential elections of 1960, which I regard as more typical
than 1964, Moorhead went for Nixon by an overwhelming majority; rural Clay County supported Kennedy;
Breckenridge supported Kennedy; and rural Wilkin
County supported Nixon. The political patterns of the
two counties, then, tend to be opposite in nature.
Events Leading to the Primary Election

One issue overshadowed all other issues and problems
within Minnesota's Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party in
1966. This was the question of who was to receive the
Party's endorsement for Governor. Because the gubernatorial issue played such an important role in my own
election campaign, I will consider the developments in
both areas as parallel series of events, starting first with
what came to be known popularly as the "Keith-Rolvaag"
dispute.
The Seventh Congressional District of Minnesota is
considered as the "springboard" for Lt. Governor
Keith's campaign to secure the endorsement for Governor. According to Greg Powers, Seventh District D.F.L.
Chairman in 1966, the agriculturally oriented district
would "die on the economic vine" unless it could obtain
help both from a rejuvenated state party under young
leadership, and a Governor who appreciated the problems of the district and who would work harder to secure Federal and State assistance. (The Forum, FargoMoorhead, July 3, 1966). The District has not elected
a D.F.L. Congressman since 1956, and has long felt
ignored by the urban-oriented D.F.L. leadership in the
Twin Cities.
As early as 1960, the late A . 0 . Reierson, then District
D.F.L. Chairman, had been attracted to Keith, with whom
he had worked for the nomination of John F. Kennedy for
President. Keith had built a reputation as an unusually
capable and independent young politician and Reierson
took it upon himself to become one of Keith's major advisors. Reierson played a crucial role in winning Keith's
endorsement as the Party's candidate for Lt. Governor
in 1962, over the objections of Karl Rolvaag. Later he
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even considered the possibility of Keith's moving to the
Seventh District in 1964 to run against Congressman
Odin Langen. It was Reierson again who, after the State
Party Conference ( the Sugar Hills Conference) of August, I 965, was one of several Party leaders who advised
Governor Rolvaag not to run for re-election. The reason
for his opposition to the Governor, according to Party
regulars, was that Rolvaag had failed to maintain adequate communications with outstate district Party officials, and had thus ignored the problems of the Seventh
District. Whatever the reasons, though, the Seventh District D.F.L. leaders became the staunchest and most important backers of Keith .
Shortly before his death in October, 1965, Reierson
was quoted as saying that the Seventh District should
deliver at least 1 30 out of 151 delegate votes for Keith
in any convention battle over the gubernatorial endorsement. (The Forum, Fargo-Moorhead, July 3, 1966). It
became Greg Powers' task to make good on this promise,
and he spent two months touring the District to build
what he called "the unity of the District Party." Although he did not openly seek support for Keith, he
stressed the objective of having the District Party vote
as a bloc at the State Convention. The implication was
obvious, however.
The Sugar Hills Conference also considered several
issues other than the future of Governor Rolvaag. For
one thing, the Party leaders who were there expressed a
determination to win D .F.L. control of the State Legislature. The Party has never had a majority of seats in the
State Senate, and it failed to regain control of the House
of Representatives in 1964, even though that was a landslide year for the Democratic Party nationally. Thus it
was decided to concentrate on legislative races in which
Conservatives were felt to be most vulnerable. (I was to
find out after the election that the Senatorial contest of
the 56th District was not one of those so designated.)
Moreover, a D.F.L. Legislative Campaign Co-ordinating
Committee, consisting of representatives of groups such
as the Farmers Union, the AFL-CIO, and Teamsters
Union, state Party executive committee members, and a
number of Liberal legislators, was created to assist in the
coming election campaigns.
With this new commitment to try to capture control
of both houses of the State Legislature, and the personal
efforts of Lt. Governor Keith to find attractive legislative
candidates, it appeared that the D.F.L. Party was on the
verge of a virtual re-birth. What could not be foreseen
at the time, however, was the potential threat that the
developing Keith-Rolvaag contest held for the drive to
win legislative seats.
It was only a few weeks later that I was first approached about the possibility of running for the State
Senate. Originally, in the Fall of 1965, the approach was
made in terms something like these: "We know that the
incumbent Senator Dosland will probably win . But we
need someone to run against him, so he'll be forced to
spend his time campaigning at home. If he has no opponent, he will be used by the Republicans to campaign
against D.F.L. candidates elsewhere." When I indicated
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a slight interest in the possibility of running, the approach
changed to a more positive one. I was told that there
really was a fair chance to defeat the incumbent, and
win or lose, I would receive substantial assistance from
the Party. It was also stressed that running for the Legislature could be a very "rewarding" and educational experience for me. But what was meant by "rewarding"
was never spelled out.
Since the urging came only from two or three officials
of the State and District levels of the party, and in particular from the Director of the newly created D.F.L.
Legislative Campaign Co-ordinating Committee, I did
nothing to further my own candidacy except to feel out
the sentiments of County Party members. But the local
Party organization was still beset with factionalism and
lacking in the kind of organization and financial reserves necessary to provide needed support. So I decided
to wait to see what might develop at the precinct caucuses and the county convention of 1966.
But the caucuses in March, and the convention in
April, showed that Party members were more interested
in the gubernatorial contest than anything else. Several
caucuses passed resolutions supporting either Keith or
Rolvaag, and the county convention heard speeches by
Senator Harold Kalina of Minneapolis who spoke in behalf of the Governor, and Lt. Governor Keith who made
a personal bid for support. Although the convention
did not endorse either candidate, ten delegates were
elected to the District and State conventions of whom a
majority indicated that they "leaned" to Keith . As far
as the coming legislative races were concerned, the only
interest shown at the convention was in the adoption of
a resolution calling for the establishment of a ten-member
committee which was to (I) recommend candidates for
"all elective offices;" (2) raise funds; (3) study issues
to be used in coming campaigns; and ( 4) cooperate with
the D.F.L. Party of Wilkin County.
Factionalism in the Clay County Party was manifested
by the complete takeover of Party otfices by the same
group which had managed to elect the Chairman the
previous year. One of the results of this takeover was
the ouster from major Party office of a key local representative of organized labor. His reaction, as reported
by the press, was that "This could well mean the end
of an active united Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party in
this area." (The Forum, Fargo-Moorhead, April 11,
1966).
A few weeks after the convention, a special Political
Action Committee was set up under my chairmanship
for the purpose of finding legislative candidates, in accordance with the convention resolution. The Committee
met three times and succeeded only in discussing the possible candidacies of myself for the Senate, and Clifford
Ouse for the House of Representatives. No new candidates were found, and no new sources of money were
discussed.
During this time, though, the gubernatorial issue came
to a climax. The Seventh District D.F.L. convention in
May shouted a resounding endorsement of Keith, and
the State D.F.L. convention in June endorsed Keith,

The Minnesota Academy of Science

after twenty ballots and three days of exhausting deliberations. For a number of legislative candidates, too, the
State convention marked the beginning of official partisan interest in their campaigns. Potential candidates for
the State Senate were invited to a briefing session and
dinner meeting with incumbent Senators on the Friday
evening before the convention began. At the briefing session several Senators described their own experiences
with campaigning and offered advice on how to defeat
Conservatives. Their purpose was to imbue the newcomers with the determination and resolve necessary to
help the D.F.L. Party capture control of the State Senate.
The potential candidates were also informed that financial assistance for their campaigns would soon be forthcoming from the proceeds of a fund-raising dinner which
incumbent Liberal legislators had held in January.
Within a few weeks after the State convention, special
district conventions were held for the purpose of endorsing legislative candidates. In 1964, the Constitution of the
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party had been amended to
include a new provision: "Where the boundaries of legislative districts are less than one county or extend over
several counties or parts of several counties, legislative
district conventions shall be held for the purpose of endorsement of candidates for the legislature. Delegates
elected at the last precinct caucuses within the legislative district shall constitute the legislative district convention." (Constitution of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor
Party of Minnesota, 1965, Article IV, Section 4). The
purpose of this provision was to encourage more Party
involvement in legislative contests, since endorsement
before candidates filed for office could mean financial
and organizational support from the very beginning of
their campaigns.
I received the endorsement of a special 56th District
convention which met at Breckenridge on June 27. I had
no difficulty in securing Party backing because there was
no one else in the District who had any desire to run for
the Senate. On the recommendation of the Political Action Committee, the convention also endorsed Clifford
Ouse to run in the newly-created rural Clay-Wilkin district. (It should be noted that Ouse was still Wilkin
County D.F.L. Chairman and was to run against Representative Arlan Stangeland, the Wilkin County G.O.P.
Chairman.)
I set to work the following day to establish a volunteer
committee and to order my first campaign literature. Because candidates are limited in what they can personally
spend on their campaigns, the customary procedure in
Minnesota is to set up volunteer committees which are
not legally limited in what they can spend on behalf of
an individual. On the advice of friends, I asked a Moorhead resident, who is in the business of preparing income
tax returns for farmers, to be the chairman of the Volunteer Committee for Kendrick for State Senate. Our reason for approaching this particular individual was that
he had many of the attributes that I lacked. That is, he
was Lutheran, was well known among farm families in
Clay County, had a Scandinavian background, and was
well-known by other Moorhead businessmen. He also
Journal of, Volume Thirty-four, No. 2, 1967

was identified with the "out" faction of the Clay County
D.F.L. Party, and coincidentally had the same last name
as the Conservative Representative from Wilkin County,
Stangeland. We felt that this last characteristic might not
only confuse people, but also would serve to pick up Republican votes, since the volunteer committee chairman's
name customarily appears on most campaign literature
distributed by and for a candidate.
Later, a co-chairman, a well-known attorney in Breckenridge, was also asked to serve on the Volunteer Committee. Although he did very little in the way of actively
suporting my candidacy, the co-chairman did allow his
name to be attached to radio and newspaper ads which
were used in Wilkin County. Other officers included a
Treasurer, who was a Catholic and the wife of a Moorhead school teacher, and a Secretary, who was Clay
County D.F.L. Chairwoman. The Volunteer Committee
eventually came to include approximately twenty-five
other individuals from around the District, including
Moorhead State College faculty members, farmers in
rural Clay and Wilkin Counties, and party actives from
Moorhead, Dilworth, and Breckenridge. My objective,
which was never fully realized, was to find a volunteer
precinct chairman in every precinct and township of the
56th District. To find such assistants I traveled about the
District asking individuals who were recommended by
friends, and who would in turn recommend others. All
in all, I traveled some 12,000 miles in four and a half
months of campaigning in a district that is approximately
80 miles long and 35 miles wide. I was successful to the
extent of finding volunteer help in about one-half of all
the townships of the District.
After the Breckenridge convention, I also prepared a
mailing to be sent out to all known Democrats in the
District, asking for their active help. Moreover, I attended County fairs, went on Chamber of Commerce
agri-business tours, and started to be seen at church suppers and rural picnics. It began to look quite promising
for me until the early part of July, when Governor Rolvaag announced that he intended to file for re-election.
The immediate effect of this announcement was to create
severe depression within the D.F.L. Party ranks at all
levels. The day after the Governor's announcement, I
attended the second half of the State Party convention,
where I had my picture taken with Senator Mondale and
Lt. Governor Keith. At that time it was quite apparent
that the gubernatorial contest would again take precedence over all other matters in the D.F.L. Party.
A few days later, the Moorhead members of the Political Action Committee managed to talk a Political Science Professor, football coach, and Lutheran Minister
from Concordia College of Moorhead, Rodney Grubb,
into running for the State House of Representatives.
Grubb was a long-time resident of Moorhead, a member
of the School Board, well known within city business
circles, and not an active D.F.L. Party member. Since he
appeared to be the ideal candidate to defeat the incumbent Representative, endorsement by another special
convention convened just the evening before the deadline for filing for public office, was secured without op141

position. Thus the local D.F.L. Parties finally had a full
slate of promising legislative candidates in the 56th District.
Several weeks after the Governor filed for re-election,
all legislative candidates without Primary Election opposition were advised by the Seventh Congressional District
field representative of the State D.F.L. Party that in order to avoid "confusion" they should do little or no active campaigning until after the Primary Election on September 13. Candidates were also advised that they had
to "make a definite choice" between Keith and Rolvaag.
Since I had been warned a few days earlier by the Clay
County D.F.L. Chairman that I had better not be seen
with Governor Rolvaag should he visit Moorhead, the
implications of this "definite choice" were clear to me.
My immediate reaction was to ignore the advice because
I did not see how I could possibly cover a district as
large as the 56th in only about eight weeks time. However, I found that the local D.F.L. Party leaders were
again mainly interested in helping to secure the election
of the Lt. Governor, and I had to campaign largely without local party help.
But I did receive assistance from the State D.F.L. Party
before the Primary Election. In August, an informative
conference was held in Detroit Lakes by the Director of
the Legislative Campaign Coordinating Committee on
how to make up campaign literature, lawn signs, and
other forms of advertising. Also, several publications
were distributed to candidates, including a DFL Legislators' 1966 Campaign Handbook, a pamphlet called The
Law ... and Your Campaign, by Representative Robert Latz, and the DFL Legislators 1966 Issues Handbook. The latter publication was the most valuable and
consisted of short essays on the outstanding issues of the
1965 Legislative Session along with selected roll-call
votes. From this book we were able to put together campaign material on our opponents' voting records. The Coordinating Committee also sponsored in September a
Legislative Issues Conference at which leading Liberal
Representatives and Senators discussed the important issues of the campaign and offered advice on how to use
certain issues in particular elections. Finally the Coordinating Committee secured financial assistance from incumbent Liberal legislators and the Minnesota Federation of Labor. But because certain labor unions chose to
back the Governor in the primary, there was not as much
money available as had been anticipated.
Before the Primary, in addition to traveling about the
District, going door-to-door in some of the urban precincts of Moorhead and Breckenridge, and appearing at
all the public events I could get to, I also had literature
and lawn signs printed, sent out several press releases,
and developed the issues which I intended to use after
the Primary. I asked one of my colleagues and a very
good friend, Dwight Harshbarger of the Moorhead State
College Psychology Department, to be my Campaign
Manager. Together we developed strategy and issues. The
issues which we eventually decided to use were these:
l. "Time for a change in the State Senate." This meant
that it was time to end the 108-year Conservative control
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of the State Senate. There could never be a true D.F.L.
or Liberal majority in the State until the Conservative
oligarchy came to an end.
2. "Let the people know." The implications of this
slogan were that the incumbent Senator had failed to inform the public about his voting record, and that he
might even have misinformed his constituents. It was a
vague issue, but its very vagueness we regarded as a virtue, since it might make people question the incumbent's
sincerity.
At this point it should be stressed that finding good
issues was the greatest problem confronting my campaign. The incumbent Senator had made a good, albeit
Conservative, record for himself in the Legislature, and
had been particularly effective in his errand-running duties. I discovered very early in my campaigning that an
incumbent is judged by a great many people solely on
the basis of what he has done for them. To a small town
with a high school that is facing consolidation, the Senator who protects the school from the State Department
of Education is the one to vote for, regardless of his
party affiliation or his views on other issues. Or to a
state college administration which feels the incumbent
has secured appropriations for building construction, it
is little short of heresy for someone to run against him.
Unless the incumbent has made some serious mistake, or
has ignored an important group, it is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to find what can be called a "winning"
issue. Thus, the campaign had to be run mainly on the
basis of personal contact with the voters and name recognition. And this is very difficult for a three-year resident candidate to do in a semi-rural district of 50,000
people.
As a state college faculty member running against an
incumbent who was quite popular with the Administration, I encountered some unusual problems. I was not
opposed openly by the Administration, but I did become
the object of occasional remarks about the legality and
propriety of state employees running for public office.
Also, an important statement in support of my opponent
was made by a State College Board member during a
visit to the campus in August to deliver the Summer
Commencement Address. Although the Board member
himself was a former Liberal legislator, he praised my
opponent as one who was "objective," while "protecting
Moorhead's interests." He also said that if re-elected
Senator Doslancl would be moved into "increasing areas
of responsibility within the Senate." (Ih e Forum, FargoMoorhead, Aug. 25, 1966). I responded to this statement by sending to my colleagues some selections from
Senator Dosland's voting record, along with a letter
criticizing the "objectionable" and "inappropriate" remarks made by the College Board member.
A more serious problem with which I was confronted
before the Primary Election was the increasing animosity
which developed between the Keith and Rolvaag supporters in my District. To a great extent this division
followed the lines of the old factional split within the
local Party organization. That is, most of those who established the Clay County Citizens for Rolvaag Commit-
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tee in early August were members of the "out" group.
But in Clay County, as well as in most of the Seventh
Congressional District, the Keith people were in control
of D.F.L. Party machinery. As a result, I often found
myself either touring the county with the Lt. Governor
when he visited the District, or distributing his literature, as well as my own, when I went door-to-door. On
the other hand, when the Governor visited the area, I
was expected as a Party official and endorsed candidate
to ignore him. This had the effect of needlessly antagonizing both key Rolvaag supporters and members of the
"out" faction. The fact was, however, in the Seventh
Congressional District, it was difficult to be anything but
a Keith supporter before the Primary Election.
After the Primary Election

Despite the best efforts of the Seventh District D.F.L.
Party machinery, the Governor carried the District by a
3 to 2 margin. In the 56th District Keith lost Clay County
by a 950 to 706 margin, but carried Wilkin County by
517 to 392 votes. Thus the total vote was relatively
close, a 1342 to 1223 margin in favor of Rolvaag.
Four days after the Primary, Keith announced that he
would support Governor Rolvaag for re-election in November. He qualified his announcement, however, by
saying 'This does not mean I feel any less strongly about
the cause I've been pursuing these past months. On the
contrary, it is because I continue to be deeply concerned
with the future of the party and the state that I take this
position" (The Red River Scene, Sept. 19, 1966). This
lack of enthusiasm for supporting the Governor was reflected in Clay and Wilkin Counties. In Wilkin County,
whatever D.F.L. Party organization had been developed
before the Primary, virtually disappeared afterward. In
Clay County, the D.F.L. Party Chairman pledged support for the Governor, but in fact offered very little in
the way of actual support. The same was true for most
of the other leading Keith supporters within the local
party, although the Executive Committee did send a congratulatory telegram to the Governor a week after the
Primary. It was at this point that the old factional division within the organization again came to the surface.
The leaders of the "out" group, many of whom had supported the Governor, attempted to use the Keith defeat
as a way to regain influence within the Party. On the
other hand, the "in" group attempted to maneuver itself into the position of directing the Governor's campaign in Clay County. This brought about a stalemate
which was superficially resolved by forming a new Clay
County Rolvaag Committee made up of representatives
from both sides. This seemed to take care of things for
awhile, but in fact did little to solve the personal animosities which had been at the root of the factional dispute
for many years.
That nothing had really been settled became apparent
on October 28, when the County Chairman suddenly announced to the press and television that he had withdrawn his support from the Governor. Ostensibly, his
reason was that the Governor had "disregarded our
county organization and used his volunteer group" to
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handle his campaign (The Red River Scene, Oct. 31,
1966). In fact, however, the announcement was the result of a dispute between Keith and Rolvaag supporters
over the handling of financial contributions for the Governor.
The statewide Rolvaag Committee responded by sending the Governor's Campaign Coordinator to Moorhead
in an effort to smooth out the dispute. Also, a special
Seventh District D.F.L. Holloween Fun Fest and Gala
was held in Moorhead featuring most of the State candidates as well as entertainment provided by several vocal groups and a professional comedian. Finally, only a
few days before the election, the Governor, the entire
State D.F.L. ticket, and Senators McCarthy and Mondale
appeared in the Seventh District on a "Victory Express"
train which made some twenty whistle stops between St.
Paul and Moorhead. At each of the stops, the Governor
would deliver a short speech attacking the Republicans
for trying to impose a sales tax on Minnesota, and would
also introduce any Liberal legislative candidates who
happened to be present and urge the crowd to support
them. All of these efforts were of little avail, however,
because the Governor was defeated in Clay County by a
margin of two thousand votes.
As for my own campaign, the settlement of the D.F.L.
gubernatorial dispute meant at least that I would no
longer have to worry about that particular issue. But I
was suddenly confronted with a very well organized campaign against me, which began immediately after the
Primary Election. In August, the Clay County Republican Executive Committee had contributed a total of
$4000 to the three Conservative legislators. Senator
Dosland had received the lion's share of $2000, which
indicates how badly the Republicans wanted him reelected . The Republicans also set up what was regarded
as the most effective G.O.P. campaign organization outside the Twin Cities Metropolitan area.
My opponent, although assisted by the Republicans,
played a "nonpartisan" role throughout his campaign.
He generally remained aloof from Republican Party
events, was vague and evasive when asked about his
Party affiliation, and in general tried to appear as the
benefactor of most groups within the District. In fact,
one of his newspaper ads consisted of a picture of the
Senator standing next to Governor Rolvaag, as the Governor signed a bill which Dosland presumably authored.
Under the picture was the caption "He knows how to
get the job done," which was his slogan throughout his
campaign. Moreover, none of his campaign literature indicated any connection with the Republican Party, and
he also avoided public contact with the two Representatives from the District, one of whom, Arlan Stangeland,
openly advertised his Party affiliation. It was an obviously wise tactic for a well-known incumbent to use, and
it was very effective.
Prior to the Primary Election, the Conservatives did
very little in the way of open campaigning. They did a
great deal of traveling around the District contacting voters personally and at public events, but it was not until
143

after the Primary that they distributed lawn signs, bumper stickers, and literature, and ran ads in the newspapers
and on radio. My opponent, in particular, ran a very
vigorous campaign, and within a week after the Primary,
his name was appearing on hundreds of cars and trucks,
and on billboards in both counties. One of the most effective forms of campaign advertising I have ever seen
was the erection one night just four weeks before the
election of 500 Dosland lawn signs along busy thoroughfares in the City of Moorhead. This had a very demoralizing effect upon some of my supporters.
My own campaign was also stepped up after the Primary Election. But instead of appearing as a non-partisan
candidate, my supporters and I decided that my best
chance was to emphasize D.F.L. endorsement and to
appeal to the partisan interests of the District's voters.
Since I was not well known outside the City of Moorhead, we felt that this would be the best way to attract
votes in the rural areas of Clay County where the D.F.L.
Party has been traditionally strong. As for voters in
Moorhead who were acquainted with me, we felt it
would make little difference to them what my party affiliation might be.
In the eight weeks between the two elections, my supporters and I accomplished the following: we erected ten
4'x8' billboards along well-traveled highways in the District; we erected a total of about 800 lawn signs in Moorhead and Breckenridge, and in several small towns; we
ran a series of advertisements on one television and two
radio stations; we ran a series of ads, some supplied by
the D.F.L. Legislative Campaign Coordinating Committee, in all the local newspapers; we telephoned all known
Democrats in Moorhead the day before the election; we
conducted a series of about twenty coffee parties in
Moorhead neighborhoods; we distributed approximately
30,000 pieces of literature throughout the District; and
we distributed ten cartop signs to individuals in both
Counties.
In addition to these cooperative efforts, which probably involved the services of about forty to fifty people
in the last days of the campaign, I personally spent all
of my free time traveJing about the District, attending
church suppers, appearing with statewide and Congressional candidates, meeting with lobby groups, ringing
doorbells in D.F.L.-oriented areas, and in general trying
to meet as many people as I possibly could. My rough
estimate is that I contacted personally about 25 per cent
of the voters in the District. I also made a special effort
to attend dinners, picnics, or business meetings of groups
such as the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the Farmers Union, the National Farmers Organization, and other groups which
were inclined to give me their support. As far as public
speeches were concerned, my only opportunities were at
a few "meet your candidate" forums, Parent-Teachers
meetings, and the like. Thus the emphasis was almost
exclusively on simply meeting people individually and
making a good appearance. l might add that i campaigned in addition to teaching three courses at the College and acting as Chairman of the Political Science Department.
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Among the problems which I encountered in my postPrimary campaign was the lack of coordination with the
other two legislative candidates. The decision of the
rural Clay and Wilkin County candidate, Clifford Ouse,
to run a completely independent campaign, no doubt
cost me some much-needed organizational and financial
support, particularly in Wilkin County. And the attempt
of the other House candidate, Rodney Grubb, to run a
seemingly nonpartisan campaign in Moorhead, also added to my difficulties there.
Another problem was the opposition of a group of
Republican-oriented Moorhead State College faculty
members, who circulated a derogatory letter implying
that "personal gain" was one of my motives in running
for the Legislature. But more serious, however, was the
lack of local Party support. Although I ran openly as
an endorsed candidate, the factional dispute and lack
of initiative on the part of local Party regulars prevented
them from providing the kind of support, in the form of
distributing literature and contacting voters, that I sorely
needed and had been led to expect.
Finally, there was again the problem of trying to find
a "winning issue." My supporters and I ran newspaper
ads criticizing the incumbent's voting record, and calling
attention to the fact that he was a Republican. But we
had very little else to go on. The sales tax issue, used
effectively by the state-wide candidates, was rejected by
my supporters, because most of them felt that a sales
tax would not really be a bad thing for Minnesota.
The election results matched the predictions. In Clay
County, I was defeated by a majority of 8,701 to 2,831
votes, and in Wilkin County by a majority of 2,216 to
904 votes. Thus the ratio was approximately 3 to 1. My
Liberal running mates were also defeated, although not
by such overwhelming majorities. Grubb lost by a vote
of 4,654 to 2,732 and Ouse lost by a vote of 4,170 to
3,505. As for the State D.F.L. candidates, only one, Joseph Donovan, the endorsed candidate for Secretary of
State managed to carry Clay County, and he only by a
250-vote majority. In Wilkin County, Walter Mondale
and Joseph Donovan were the only D.F.L. winners. Thus
the vote in both counties reflected the general Republican trend throughout the nation, which gave the G.O.P.
700 new seats in state legislatures and control of nineteen more state legislative chambers.
Financially, the Senatorial race in the 56th District
was one of the most expensive in local history. The
total reported campaign expenditures for myself and
Senator Dosland were $3,199 and $6,619, respectively.
Since many campaign expensed are unreported, however,
the actual totals were probably closer to $4000 and
$8000, respectively. Breaking down my reported contributions and expenses gives a fair estimate of the kind of
support I received and where the money went.
Report of Volunteer Committee for Kendrick for State
Senate:
Receipts
Clay County D.F.L. Party ...... . ..... $ 200.00
Wilkin County D.F.L. Party ...... . .. . 100.00
50.00
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

The Minnesota Academy of Science

37.50
400.00
100.00

Clay County D.F.L. Women's Club ... .
Minnesota Federation of Labor ...... .
Mrs. Frank J. Kendrick ......... . .. .
Miscellaneous and individual
contributions

886.30

Total $1773.80
Disbursements
Printing ......... . ..... . .......... $ 396. I 0
Advertising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882.04
Television ads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 .00
Office supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11.90
Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45. IO
Total

$1772.14

Thus, the Committee ended up with a surplus of $1.66.
Personal report:
Receipts
D.F.L. Incumbent Senators ........... $ 300.00
Miscellaneous contributions . . . . . . . . . . 625.00
Total

$ 925.00

Disbursements
Salaries, Wages, Fees ................ $
Communications, mailing,
transportation, travel ............. .
Advertising ............ . .......... .
Printing .......................... .
Office supplies .................... .
Miscellaneous ..................... .
Total

178.55
234.74
691.86
162.00
44.02
I 16.00

$1427.17

From the above, it can be seen that my best supporters
were the labor unions, the local D.F.L. Party organizations, and friends. My biggest expenses were for radio,
television, and newspaper advertising. Although very
few people during the campaign ever thought that I
could actually defeat the incumbent Senator, it is worth
noting that I received more in the way of financial support than any Liberal legislative candidate in the history of Clay County.
Conclusions
The movement which had begun in Minnesota's Seventh Congressional District to put Sandy Keith into the
Governor's chair, ended with the victory of a Republican
Governor, and the loss of several important Uberal legislators from the District, as well as a number of good
Liberal candidates. The net loss meant that the D.F.L.
Party in the Seventh District was now actually worse off
than it had been before the Fall of 1966.
Given the tremendous majorities by which Liberal candidates were defeated in my District, it would be impossible to credit any single factor with the loss. But several
factors do stand out, at least as far as my own campaign
is concerned. For one thing, I had little or no support locally from labor or business. I did fairly well with the
farm organizations, but the labor unions and local businessmen regarded my opponent as the safest candidate.
I also had little organizational support from the local
D.F.L. Party organizations in either County, although
they did give me considerable financial assistance. The
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Keith-Rolvaag split contributed greatly to the lack of
local Party support, both before the Primary Election
and after.
Secondly, we had no "winning issue." Without a good
issue it is extremely difficult to defeat an incumbent who
maintains good contacts with, and performs services for,
the major groups in his district.
Third, I was new to the District, having lived in Moorhead for only three years, and my political experience
was slight. And not only did I lack experience, but so
did most of my supporters.
Finally, my supporters and I were up against an extremely well run campaign backed by an effective party
organization.
This brings me to the question of party designation,
which is very relevant to the subject of campaigning. It
should be clear from the foregoing presentation that
Minnesota's political parties are very much involved in
legislative politics, despite the law against party designation. The D.F.L. Party in 1966 picked eleven marginal
Senatorial districts in which to concentrate its resources,
and assisted in many others to a lesser extent. The Republican Party, on the other hand, spread its resources
more evenly and helped all its candidates. The G.O.P.
did not, however, attempt to find candidates in districts
it was sure to lose. Moreover, the Republicans did not
stress party endorsement as much as did the Democrats.
Endorsement or not, both Parties do play active roles
in legislative campaigns, although some candidates, such
as my own opponent, may try to avoid open party identification. Thus the law against party designation serves
only one purpose in legislative electoral politics. That is,
it permits candidates and groups, if they so choose, to be
coy and evasive about their affiliation. This in turn makes
it very difficult for challengers, unless they can find some
outstanding issues, to campaign except by contacting literally thousands of voters on a personal basis. For the
minority party, then, it is all the more difficult to defeat
the majority.
The lack of party designation also permits evasiveness
on issues. The voters have a more difficult task identifying candidates with issues, if they do not know their party
affiliation. This again tends to personalize the campaigning and to encourage voters to choose solely on the basis
of personal knowledge or acquaintanceship with the candidate.
Legislative contests in any state are to a great extent
little more than personality contests. But Minnesota's
lack of party designation only adds to this situation by
encouraging evasiveness. Thus, political parties are probably the most ineffective pressure groups in the entire
State, and the vacuum left by the parties only encourages
more special interest representation by members of the
State Legislature.
I would like to conclude with a statement about the
1966 election which was made by Lt. Governor Keith
on November 10, just two days after the defeat of Governor Rolvaag: "We beat ourselves, frankly. The very
fact that we had to go through an open primary
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The same thing happened in 1956 in our presidential
primary between Kefauver and Stevenson. . .. In politics, you usually beat yourself, you don't get defeated,
. . . especially when you're in office." (The Red River
Scene, Nov. 14, 1966). This statement, in general, expresses my own views of the election of 1966.
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Democracy on Trial in Asia
]OOINN LEE

University of Minnesota, Morris
ABSTRACT - A study of the feasibility of democracy in the developing nations in Asia. The premise of this study is that the Asian concept of democracy is not tantamount to the Anglo-American
counterpart. The vorious types of democracy that exist in the new nations of Asia today are, in
fact, alternative to Western democracy and are hardly democracy at all. Rather, they are authoritarian regimes. The emerging nations of Asia are at the threshold of political modernization,
and such contingency can be met by a particular socio-political system. The authoritarian regimes
of Asia are such systems in point. The requisites of democracy are not yet readily available in the
developing nations of Asia and authoritarianism appears as a symptom of the birth of new nations from old societies. However, the present rejection of democracy in Asia does not necessarily
mean that democracy will not be feasible in Asia in the future.

'Jhe record of nation-building in twentieth-century
Asia seems to commence with a chapter on the establishment of authoritarianism, despite our firm conviction
that democracy is the best form of political system for
all nations and that popular government will ultimately
triumph over dictatorial government. In most Asian
emerging nations, many of the paraphernalia of democracy
ended with forms devoid of substance. Representative
governments have more frequently failed than succeeded
to grow and bear fruits. The political culture of Asia does
not seem to provide the Asians with a fertile ground for
democratic institutions. What makes the lure of authoritarianism so forceful and the appeal of democracy so
powerless in Asia? This question requires us to analyze
the feasibility of democracy in the developing nations of
Asia.
Social Setting of Asian Developing Nations
and the Requisites of Effective Democracy

Asiatic society is basically what Wittfogel (1963: 8
and passim) referred to as "hydraulic society" and "agromanagerial or agrobureaucratic society." These societies are featured by social conservatism, extreme localism, and fairly rigid local structures. Traditionally
Oriental societies were accustomed to the despotic
strength of political authority. In such rigidly stratified
agrarian societies, the strength of a nation was often
The author received the B. A., summa cum /aude, from Chosun Christian University, 1957; M. A., University of North
Dakota, 1958; and Ph.D., University of Illinois, 1962, in political science. Since 1961, he has been associated with the
University of Minnesota, Morris, where he is currently Associate professor in the Department of Political Science.
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based on patriotic feeling of the people and on the stability founded upon ancient traditions. Social structure
mainly consisted of a handful of aristocrats, who were
land owners, artisans, bureaucrats, and the rest of the
population, the majority of whom were the peasantry.
The first was in a predominant position to exert influence whereas the last was not represented. Unlike a
property-bound, individualistic Western society, therefore, the tradition-bound, family-based Oriental society
has experienced for the past centuries autocratic political
heritages in which the real political power is oriented by
politicians rather than by the grass roots. As Kautsky
( 1962: 19) pointed out, politics in such a society is "the
only road to prestige and high social position, apart from
the limited opportunities sometimes provided by the religious hierarchy."
In such traditional Asiatic nations, democratic aspirations do not seem to have materialized. Democracy can
be instituted and maintained when there are both accessible elites and available population, and when diverse
interests of society can be sufficiently ba'lanced and represented through the political process. Modern democracy
requires a social system that Kornhauser (1959: 39) defined as a mass society "in which elites are readily accessible to influence by non-elites and non-elites are
readily available for mobilization by elites." Such a mass
society, in turn, must be composed of an educated and
fairly prosperous electorate without concentration of
wealth; social classes without bitter, religious, and sectional antagonisms; and a pluralistic society in which
many private loyalties and associations can prosper; with
all tending to buttress the principles and goals of democracy.
The Minnesota Academy of Science

